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his pre-election paper from the Romanian Academic Society 
uses state capture and policy capacity as the two main 
indicators to evaluate the stakes of the forthcoming November 
2004 elections. As Romania scores the lowest on political 
competitiveness amongst new EU entrants or applicants, a 
change in power in Romania is likely to bring more benefits than risks, this 
report concludes. However, changing the corrupt operating mode of the 
Romanian society is likely to be a difficult job, even for the only politician fully 
aware of the stakes of this game and willing to fight it openly, Traian 
Băsescu. 
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Can 2004 elections free the Romanian state from capture, or Europe 
will embrace its first fully-fledged predatory elite with Romania’s 2007 
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HOW TO UNDERSTAND 
CORRUPTION IN ROMANIA 
Can 2004 elections free the Romanian state from 
capture, or Europe will embrace its first fully-fledged 
predatory elite when Romania joins in 2007?  
 
In order to stimulate change in a society, we must first understand how it works. 
There are reasons why some states are weak and function alongside their society 
rather than together with it. Far too often, externally induced processes of 
modernization end up as ‘simulated change’ against the backdrop of structural, 
informal continuities. Governments pretend to govern, and citizens pretend to follow, 
but, in practice, informal economies thrive, taxes are only partially collected, policies, 
whether good or bad, are seldom implemented and an informal order balances the 
formal one, rendering statistics a poor instrument in describing the society. Such 
countries seem to resist ‘modernization’ despite successive government pledges and 
decades of modernization policies. They do not develop modern bureaucracies. Their 
peasants do not turn into citizens but remain dependent on local power holders. Their 
politics remains confined to networks of clients and do not open to the entire society. 
Predators control their economies, not only taking the lion’s share of resources but 
also, in the process of enriching themselves, generating massive poverty for the rest 
of society. There are appearances of democracy and market, but they are deceptive, 
remaining, for the most part, forms without content. Particularism is high in such 
societies. Particularism is the mentality prevailing in collectivistic societies where 
standards for the way a person should be treated depend on the group to which the 
person belongs. This is the opposite of universalism, the practice of individualistic 
societies, where equal treatment applies to everyone. In a universal society, rules of 
the game tend to be the same everywhere and behavior is easy to predict; in 
particularistic societies, rules tend to be specific to that society only and behavior is 
predictable for insiders only. Of course, the two are ideal models, and universalism is 
not perfect in Western societies, nor is particularism consistent across the 
underdeveloped world.  
All these are important for the social stratification of postcommunist countries, due to 
annihilation of many other definitions of the individual’s distance from the groups or 
networks holding power. The closer an individual is to the source of power, be it a 
charismatic leader or a privileged group (such as the nomenklatura during the 
communist era), the better positioned he or she is to enjoy a superior status. 
Individuals who enjoy this privilege are linked in status-based groups such as castes, 
orders, or networks. Their access to public goods is disproportionately larger 
compared to those not included in such networks and groups. Figures from public 
opinion surveys show that only networked people get their share. People with 
resources have to bribe to obtain what is rightfully theirs out of the public goods. But 
the two categories together make less than 25% of the whole society. Most 
Romanians can only summon resources to bribe occasionally (for instance, when a 
Romania is still 
predominantly a 
status society where 
people are treated 
according to how 
close they are to the 
group in power 
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health crisis occurs in one’s family) in the rest of time just having to accept 
deprivation1. 
Tab. 1. Designating the privileged 
Source: IBEU Gallup survey 
As Tab. 1 shows, there is generalized perception that some groups are above the law, 
more notoriously politicians, policemen, the networked and the rich. Same groups are 
perceived to enjoy privileges regardless the change of regime. Upwardly-mobile 
individuals strive to become part of such status groups rather than change the rule of 
the game: there is a culture of privilege underpinning status societies. The majority 
less endowed with resources of every kind stand to lose, though, and they show their 
resentment in opinion surveys. This subverts the trust in important political 
institutions. 
Where do this privileged, status groups come from? Communism created special 
‘politocracies’, as power was the main instrument of allocating social rewards. 
Political office was closely intertwined with social status, generating what Andrew 
János called a ‘modern version of the old tables of rank’. Evidence gathered from 
studies examining the political economy of communism suggests that the uneven 
distribution of power according to status was the norm rather than the exception under 
communist rule. Examples of such status holders range from the apparatchik, the 
“director”, the party member, the civil servant, or the state salesman in charge of 
allocating resources, always in short supply, to the members of any group recognized 
officially, such as the Union of Writers and Journalists or a sports club. As other 
resources or forms of social stratification had been de facto annihilated, status 
became the main provider of social hierarchy.  
Such status groups were able to convert influence into wealth during the transition 
and, unlike in other accession countries, in Romania they still hold disproportionate 
control of all opportunities, therefore hindering free market relations and fair 
competition. Businesspeople, journalists, normal citizens and, in the last years, the 
authors of the European Commission Regular Report on Romania, all allude to this 
phenomenon when speaking about Romania’s widespread corruption.  
But speaking of ‘corruption’ is somehow inaccurate here. Their definition of corruption 
is the use of public office to seek personal gain, but this definition implies that a 
public sector already exists and operates in a fair, non-discriminatory manner. This is 
seldom the case in either rural or communist societies. They have never reached the 
stage of fully-fledged modernization and their governments have never achieved the 
impartiality, impersonality, and fairness that presumably characterize modern 
                                                 
1 This argument is summarized from the report to the European Union Fifth Framework Program IBEU 
by the Romanian Academic Society; and also in Alina Mungiu-Pippidi 2004 ‘Fatalistic Political Cultures 
Revisited’ in Jan Zielonka, H.D. Klingemann, D. Fuchs and R. Inglehart Political Culture in Post-
Communist Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
 SOME PEOPLE ARE ABOVE THE LAW IN THIS COUNTRY 
Country AGREE Of which… 
Politicians 
 
Criminals 
 
The rich 
 
Policemen 
Networked 
people 
SAME PEOPLE ARE 
PRIVILEGED UNDER 
ANY REGIME 
Romania 68 88 53 87 76 91 78 
Bulgaria 87 93 83 96 74 94 78 
Serbia 81 90 89 87 75 92 82 
Montenegro 69 78 89 82 44 90 56 
Macedonia 85 92 75 90 56 91 60 
Pre-modern 
predatory elites, 
not bureaucratic 
corruption, 
represent 
Romania's main 
problem 
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bureaucracies. Therefore, corruption often manifests itself not just by the use of a 
public position for personal gain but, more broadly, as the widespread infringement of 
the norms of impersonality and fairness that should characterize modern public 
service. Influence – and therefore power – is here the main currency, not cash. In a 
world of scarcity status groups control access to every resource. Most notably to the 
state and public ones, but due to corrupt privatization, to a sizable share of the 
private resources as well. They come together to form networks, which thrive at the 
expense of the larger society. Barrington Moore called such groups ‘predatory elites’, 
who, in the process of generating prosperity for themselves, produce social poverty of 
a scale otherwise unwarranted in that society.  
Tab. 2. Discontent with main institutions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Are Romanians too critical when it comes to corruption? Actually they are not. While 
Romania falls clearly in line with other non-accession countries in the region when it 
comes to rule of law and status society, and thus emerging as a typical Balkan 
country, Romanians have clearly started to value some of their political institutions, 
and are less critical towards local government, for example (Tab. 2), seen as more 
accountable than either Parliament or the courts. Trust and accountability are related. 
Also performance in government is noticed when it exists. In Bulgaria an 
overwhelming majority appreciates the government of Simeon as less corrupt than its 
predecessors. Bulgaria has been the stage of an unprecedented large scale 
anticorruption campaign based on the cooperation between the civil society (Coalition 
2000) and the government. In only a few years this approach – so different from the 
strictly formal attempts made in Bucharest – has produced remarkable results.  
Romania, like Poland and some other countries in the region, adopted with little 
adjustment standard recipes from the global anticorruption arsenal. In such programs 
governments were asked to organize grand anticorruption shows, professions where 
traffic of influence was rife were encouraged to adopt codes of conduct, societies 
already suffering from informality and a deficit of implementation were pushed to 
adopt numerous laws and regulations. Finally, defective judiciaries and law 
enforcement agencies were burdened with the task to clean the rest of their societies. 
The results of this legalistic push were modest, in spite of the effort invested and the 
backing of donors – something the succesive governments probably suspected all 
along since they happily obliged with fresh strategies and laws every half year or so. 
However, as Tab. 3 (the Bulgarian case) shows, it does not have to be this way. 
Skepticism is not fatally grounded in poverty and attempts to really increase 
government accountability are positively perceived and rewarded by the public 
opinion.  
To put it briefly, "corruption" is a disease of the modern society and bureaucratic 
state. However, in societies where modernization itself is far from finished and the 
state has always been in the private property of certain privileged groups. The very 
notion is misleading as it suggests a completely different stage of evolution. Therefore 
serching a solution in the anticorruption toolkit of the Western developed democracies 
is inappropriate: the answers on how to build a fair and bureaucratic state are to be 
found in the history of these countries, not their current legal arsenal. The well-known 
Countries Parliament (%) Local govt (%) Courts (%) 
Romania  42 22 52 
Bulgaria  49 34 46 
Serbia  61 52 53 
Montenegro 41 35 37 
Macedonia  54 46 55 
New institutions 
are not necessary 
if what blocked the 
old ones was a 
lack of political 
will 
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concept of state capture also gets a special twist in such societies: businesses do not 
need to capture the state because the most important of them belong to people who 
already ‘own’ the state. They are MPs, ministers, have all their relatives and friends in 
the network of power. 
Tab. 3. Perception of corruption and the rule of law 
 Rom 
(%) 
Bul    
(%) 
Serb  
(%) 
Monten 
(%) 
Maced 
(%) 
In this country some people are above the law 67.5 87.4 80.5 69.0 85.4 
Too many people get away with illegal acts 
these days 
81.2 88.1 74.5 52.0 82.6 
Honesty of central govt increased compared to 
previous years 
9 52 22 19 48 
Honesty of central govt decreased compared 
to previous years 
55 21 36 27 7 
Transparency International Corruption 
Ratings* 
  2.9 4.1             2.7 2.7 
*CPI Score-2004 relates to perception of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and 
country analysts and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt)              
Source: IBEU Gallup survey, Transparency International 
Counting the rotten apples 
Some people may doubt a model relying on public perception indicators only. 
However, the Romanian Coalition for a Clean Parliament has dug up solid evidence to 
back these subjective data2. On the first count, the Coalition, formed by some of the 
most important Romanian civil society organizations, has documented 143 cases of 
candidates to Parliament from the ranks of the government party and its junior partner 
PUR who, in one form or another,  
• have made use of their public position for private gains for themselves or their 
party clientele;  
• have amassed fortunes clearly out of line with their asset declarations (ranging 
from top PSD characters such as Şerban Mihăilescu or Doru Ioan Tărăcilă who 
are millionaires but have modest bank accounts balances to report, to the more 
humble but no less difficult to explain savings account of 200,000 Euro of Mircea 
Geoană); 
• have switched repeatedly from one political party to another to keep or get some 
privilege; 
• were connected with Ceauşescu’s Securitate. 
Scores of prefects, deputy prefects and secretaries of Prefectura offices can be found 
on the list of the Coalition, as well as many leaders form county councils. PSD 
members tend to revolve around well-known companies in which many of them are 
hold shares (such as Cominco in Moldova) and which thrive on public contracts. Many 
on the electoral lists pose in successful businesspeople and display in their assets 
disclosure forms flashy cars, villas and summer houses, but the debts of their 
companies to the state budget, if paid, would substantially ease the pressure of social 
expenditures. The national pattern is reproduced at the local level. Regional groups 
converge in a super-national network mixing business with politics. The law is also 
                                                 
2 See http://contracoruptie.ong.ro  
The PSD (+PUR) 
ballot reads like a 
Romanian who's 
who in terms of 
wealth, power and 
conflicts of 
interests 
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distorted to perpetuate the network. During the last summer recess of the Parliament, 
for instance, the government passed an ordinance3 allowing big debtors to the state 
budget to hide their debts until the very convenient date of November 30, two days 
after elections, with the perspective of complete write-off at the end of December. TV 
channels with a tame, pro-government line took advantage of this ordinance 
(94/2004), and so did other party clients. Following the pressure of the civil society 
PSD withdrew from its list of candidates alomost 30 people, outrageous cases indeed 
but also without exception from provincial Romania. Their temporary marginalization 
does not mean they are out of the network, only that they took a step back, giving up 
the idea of being MPs in exchange for promises of jobs in diplomacy, public 
administration or public companies.  
The situation of the other parties does not allow any possible comparison. The 30 
black-listed candidates from contender Alliance DA, the 3 Hungarian candidates and 
the 46 members of PRM denounced as morally unfit by the civil society do not 
necessarily belong such networks (tough some individuals may do). They may be on 
their way towards this goal, but many are just individuals with a dotted personal 
record. PRM for example displays a bizzare assortment of former petty cronies of 
Ceauşescu, such as his doctor, his architect, a couple of his propagandists and 
historians, but they cannot be charged of being the big sharks of corruption in 
Romania. Unsurprisingly, the most notorious and corrupt politicians from these 
opposition parties, Hungarians included, are in business with other PSD people, in a 
nice example of cross-party cooperation. In some counties the larger network does 
include opposition parties, as it is clearly impossible to be in the big business as a 
political outsider. While the opposition leaders have become aware of the problem 
lately and partially purged their candidates lists, much remains to be done, especially 
by the Liberals, and it is unclear if Traian Băsescu, the main opposition leader, will 
have enough power to dismantle this system by himself.  
Support from the civil society does exist in this anticorruption struggle, but the media 
is divided, as many owners and publishers are themselves players in this game. For 
instance, the two main private TV channels, very different in their corporate histories 
and profile, are nevertheless part of the larger network. Antena 1 is owned by Dan 
Voiculescu, former manager of Crescent, the Cyprus offshore that handled 
Ceauşescu’s foreign trade in the late eighties. He chairs a minor party allied with PSD 
which is actully just the political outlet of his media group. ProTV is managed by 
Adrian Sârbu, who is godson of Mircea Geoană, the PSD would-be premier. Mr. Sârbu 
is also part of the selected few to have been part of CFSN, the provisional Revolution 
government in 1989, without having been a dissident. The third major channel is the 
public one, traditionally subordinated to the government anyway, who controls the 
majority in its supervisory board4. In the print press few leaders do not belong to the 
network, and the most notorious ones, with the best free press credentials, Cornel 
Nistorescu and Petre Mihai Băcanu, a former dissident, have recently been eliminated 
from the management of their newspapers.  
However, unlike his predecessors running the opposition Băsescu is at least aware 
that the system itself needs a complete overhaul. At least judging by his declarations, 
that is. Romanians are indeed fearful that an alternation in power may be again a 
missed opportunity to reform the system: they complain in surveys that regardless the 
change of regime the same oligarchs are beyond the law.  
                                                 
3 Executive order taking effect immediately after publication, before being discussed and adopted by the 
Parliament.  
4 Just to be on the safe side PSD tried to sack the board anyway recently. TVR enters elections with this 
threat hanging over its management.  
Underdevelopment 
and political 
dependency go 
hand in hand in 
Romania 
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The map of Romania drawn following the black lists of the Romanian Coalition for a 
Clean Parliament is also illuminating. Parties tend to be cleaner in Bucharest, where 
grand fraud is done usually under the appearance of legally – by spotting loopholes in 
the law to skip tenders, or passing legislation to pardon the debts of political clients. 
In territory, however, we find a correlation between the low level of development and 
and high percentage in agricultural-related occupation, on the one hand, and a high 
number of objectionable individuals on the ballots, on the other. Counties such as 
Dâmboviţa, Giurgiu, Gorj, Ialomiţa, Dolj, Botoşani, Teleorman, among the poorest 
strip areas counties in Oltenia, Muntenia and Moldova, have almost all the top 
candidates on the lists. Unfortunate cases such as Bihor or Iaşi have situations where 
practically all political parties are in the politico-economic network and it is difficult to 
find any clean electoral list to vote for. At the other extreme, the more developed 
Arad, Alba, Sibiu in Transylvania have few names on the list, and all political parties 
tend to be cleaner there.  
As it looks now, the map shows how ridiculous the slogan of separating business from 
politics still is. Of over two hundreds candidates screened, none declared a conflict of 
interest in their disclosure form, mandatory since 2003. Many are current or would-be 
MPs, and more than half own businesses in their own name, or on the names of their 
wives and children. The main incentive to become a politician, at least as a member 
of the current governing party, is to become part of the inner circle. This means you 
will not be bothered by the tax office, get at least a share from every public contract in 
your region, that every public institution in your area will buy from your private 
business (insurance, medical supplies, pesticides, IT, office supplies, construction 
services). In short, that you will get a rent. Once your influence is secured as part of 
the status group, benefits accrue naturally. Unfortunately for the captors, elections 
threaten the system, especially in dependency areas of subsistence farming. Here 
public resources are so strictly controlled by local predatory elites that whole villages 
vote PSD almost without exception, and PSD gets nearly 100% of the mayors (directly 
in elections, or through administrative and financial pressures after that). The 
development map and the corruption map of Romania are strictly correlated, as good 
theory predicts. Monitoring elections on the ballot day can only make a marginal 
difference in cliff-hanging constituencies; but the distortion of popular will is structural 
permanent in underdeveloped rural areas.  
The correlation between the lack of competitiveness of the political system and 
corruption has been proved before5. A postcommunist country is likely to be more 
corrupt if one party stays longer in government and as a result divides the spoils less. 
So far, Romania is the country with the lowest number of alternations in power after 
1989 among the EU new member and candidates, and as a result PSD is the 
strongest postcommunist party in this region. It has survived in office more than any 
other (eight years, or up to ten if we judge by some of its most prominent individual 
representatives). Little surprise therefore that the screening of the Coalition for a 
Clean Parliament confirm the finding that a long period in government with a weak 
opposition by your side increases the probability of corruption. In this terms, a rotation 
in power this year can only be beneficial for the quality of governance – and even for 
the European future of PSD itself.  
Can the electoral competition solve all these problems? The Romanian opposition has 
clearly increased its coordination capacity in the last weeks under the authoritative 
leadership of Traian Băsescu. There are still concerns, primarily among eurocrats and 
foreign commentators, that the DA Alliance does not have enough manpower and 
skills to run the machinery of the government properly. In the light of their experience 
                                                 
5 For instance by Anna Gryzmala-Buše from Princeton, writing on Hungary, Poland and the Czech 
Republic. 
A rotation in power 
in 2004 can only 
improve the quality 
of governance in 
Romania 
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with the previous center-right coalition, such worries are probably understandable. 
However, they are overblown, since both the failures of 1997-2000 and the 
achievements of 2001-2004 are exaggerated, as we argue in the next section of this 
report. The main challenge for a DA Alliance cabinet will not be technical in nature, 
such as preparing the files for Brussels or achieving budget deficit targets – after all, 
they managed trickier things in public finance management in 1998-99 and started the 
negotiations with EU in 2000. Instead, the real challenge will be to resist to the 
assault of their own clients, who will rush to replace those of PSD – and thus verify 
voters' worst expectations. Ironically, it will fall on Băsescu, a leader who begun 
politics in the same boat with the current president Ion Iliescu, to become the leader 
of the Romanian opposition vowing to destroy the corrupted system.  
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ILIESCU RETURNS WITH A VENGEANCE 
If PSD wins the continuity will be less with the current 
government, and more with the indecisive, perestroika-
style policies of 1992-1996. Iliescu may again forge a 
red-brown coalition with the extremist Vadim Tudor 
 
Most governments in transition countries have little merit for the pace of economic 
growth during their mandates. Since the post-communist economies were distorted 
and in need of substantial structural reforms, the typical indicators of growth were as 
likely to show the lack of reforms as their presence, while the beneficial effects of 
painful policies, when implemented, may have appeared only after a certain period of 
time, often longer than an election cycle.  
This is a very important point for the democratic accountability in the East-European 
societies: if the public discussion is muddled and voters cannot make the right 
connection between cause and effect, then accountability is weakened, good policies 
are not identified and rewarded, and incentives for political professionalization are 
low. Keeping the country on the right course depends in such cases only on the 
determination (and even selflessness) of its leaders, who are taking risks without 
knowing for sure if they would be able to reap political benefits before the following 
ballot. Their values, character and agenda become all the more important in such 
situations. 
Therefore, a comparative overview of the three main stages in Romania's post-
communist political history:  
− the era of pains without reform under the first full mandate of president Iliescu 
(1992-1996);  
− the era of painful reforms under the center-right coalition (1997-2000);  
− the era of harvesting the benefits of reforms under the PSD government with 
dual, Năstase-Iliescu leadership (2001-2004)  
offers a good basis for building scenarios for Romania in 2005-2008. All we have to 
do is look back at the proven track record of each of the main political actors in order 
to judge their professionalism and leadership quality.  
Romania inherited from the Communist times one of the most distorted economies in 
Eastern Europe, characterized by severe misallocation of resources; obsolete and 
energy-intensive industrial assets; primitive, subsistence agriculture, dotted with huge 
and inefficient state farms; penury of basic goods and repressed inflation; and no 
small private sector worth speaking of. The task facing the new authorities was 
staggering – but so was the situation in other transition countries like Bulgaria, while 
in the Baltic States domestic problems were compounded by the uncomfortable geo-
strategic position. The policy choices made by the political leaders after 1989 made 
therefore the all the difference, and they explain why some ex-Communist countries 
are more successful today, while others are "at the bottom of the heap".  
1992-1996 was the 
period of social 
hardship without 
reforms; we could 
fall again in the 
same trap after 
2004 
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With hindsight, SAR believes that the transition strategy most beneficial for the 
Romanian society as a whole would have been a Polish-style shock therapy in the 
early '90s aimed at correcting as many distortions as possible, as fast as possible, 
while the public enthusiasm due to democratization was still high after the overturn of 
Ceauşescu6. The stock of public assets existing in December 1989 could have been 
used to alleviate some of the pains of this shock therapy. Private property could have 
been re-constituted faster than it has been. This choice, however, required a relatively 
competent and selfless government pursuing political suicide for the greater good. 
Poland, luckily, had such a government; Romania, unfortunately, did not.  
Instead, in a move which was increasingly obvious after 1992-3, the Romanian ruling 
parties (an assortment of reformed Communist apparatchiks and nationalist 
ideologues) preferred to delegate control over economic assets, nominally state-
owned, to various rent-seeking groups, in exchange for being allowed to control 
politics unchallenged, because they had no alternative career option. Public 
resources, including property which should have been quickly restituted to rightful 
owners, were squandered with the same purpose – perpetuation in power – either on 
gifts to cronies, or on populist handouts to the voters. Given the circumstances of the 
time such developments occurred in all the new democracies of Eastern Europe. But 
the extent to which the ruling elite was risk-averse and willing to accept stagnation in 
exchange for political control made Romania unique among the EU candidates. We 
still struggle today with the effects of this deliberate strategy. There are today one 
million and a half court trials related to property restitution, most due to this sloppy 
restitution process on the basis of poor legislation and catastrophic implementation. 
They burden the Romanian Courts and make Romania closer to Albania than Central 
Europe.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 As argued by many people even in the early '90s, for example by the prominent economic analyst and 
SAR member, Ilie Şerbănescu, in his 1995 book entitled suggestively Half Baked Policies Increase 
Social Costs. 
As it turned out, 
social pain was 
inevitable, under 
both Iliescu and 
Constantinescu; 
what differed was 
the amount of 
reforms that 
accompanied it 
Fig. 1. The paradox of simultaneous decline in jobs 
and unemployment under PSD (PDSR)
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Ironically, the crucial choice Romania faced during the '90s was not between a fast 
and painful course versus a slow and painless one, as many decision-makers thought 
at that time. As history proved, social hardship was unavoidable – in the form of jobs 
losses (through deliberate restructuring or natural collapse of state-owned firms), 
hyperinflation (which eroded salaries, pensions and the savings of the poor) and 
uncertainty. All governments since 1990 are guilty for using the early retirement as an 
escape route from politically unpalatable high unemployment. This led to the paradox 
that the jobs and unemployment have often decreased in the same time (Fig. 1) and 
to a staggering dependency ratio of 1.4 pensioners per contributor today. However, 
such policies of postponing hard decisions and throwing the costs on future 
generations were prevalent especially in 1994-96 and, to a lesser extent, in 2001-04, 
as the chart shows.  
Rather, the real and only available option was whether to give a sense to this social 
suffering: push reforms faster and cross the valley of mourning – or not. And here the 
marked contrast becomes apparent between the first half of the decade, 
overwhelmingly dominated by the personality of Ion Iliescu, and the second one, of 
the center-right government. It is obvious from the brief description below that the 
interval 1993-1996 was a time lost for reforms and development in Romania.  
The Romanian transition in three steps 
• 1990-1996: After two turbulent initial years dominated by political consolidation of 
the new institutions and the first attempts to stabilize the economy and privatize, 
Romania fell into a pathological stagnation, with no clear direction of evolution. 
Economic policies were muddled and implemented with archaic, neo-soviet 
instruments. Price controls and other tools of administrative intervention in 
economy were preserved in order to continue populist redistributions. Between 
1993 and 1996 the reforms practically halted, with little to be shown in the way of 
achievements. The positive economic growth, against a background of 
hyperinflation, financial indiscipline and soaring public deficits, did probably more 
harm than good and contributed decisively to the deterioration of the banking 
system. The problem was not so much that of leftist vs. rightist policies – but that 
of the extreme indecision and lack of courage of a government headed by a weak 
prime-minister and controlled with an iron fist by president Iliescu, an 
accomplished survivor.  
The best case study to illustrate this chronic indecisiveness leading to erratic 
policies is that of property restitution: agricultural land, urban property and 
industrial mass privatization. While in other CEE countries some sort of decision 
was reached in a reasonable interval about what and how to restitute (more, like 
in the Czech Republic; or less, like in Hungary) the issue was left to drag for 
years in Romania, one social group was played against another, and property 
restitution was not regarded as a matter of law, but a subordinated, instrumental 
device employed to maximize political gains. In each area mentioned several 
successive laws were passed7, usually clashing with each other, and important 
decisions related to implementation were left to be taken case by case by the low-
level bureaucracy. Many conflicting property rights were thus created, 
unpredictability and permeability to corruption increased, and Romania has 
become the transition country with the highest rate of per capita property cases in 
courts. Unfortunately, 1992-1996 was exactly the period when the window of 
opportunity for restructuring and privatizing was wide open – favorable world 
                                                 
7 For example, two rounds of mass privatization vouchers were distributed in Romania. The second, 
issued in 1994 by the Văcăroiu government, partly canceled the effects of the first one issued by the 
Roman government in 1991, with serious legal consequences.  
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economic cycle, willing strategic investors – and the basis for the further success 
among other EU candidate countries was laid down precisely in this period.  
Key actors responsible: Ion Iliescu (president), Nicolae Văcăroiu (prime minister), 
Florin Georgescu (minister of finance) 
• 1997-2000: Against a background of political cacophony and weak 
implementation capacity that characterized the center-right coalition, important 
structural reforms were nevertheless initiated, both in the economy and the 
broader public sector. This happened because some of the new leaders truly 
believed in reforms; but also because the 1992-96 policies were clearly 
unsustainable and a correction had to take place no matter what, or else a 
Bulgarian-style crisis would have stricken Romania. In fact, the country barely 
escaped such a collapse in 1998-99, when the pile of debts made by the previous 
government had to be repaid, the bubble built in the banking sector popped off, 
and the democratic institutions had to be defended against the riots of politically-
manipulated miners. On the positive side, the problems in crucial areas of the 
economy such as the mining and heavy industry were for the first time seriously 
tackled; the currency was made convertible and prices were liberalized; interests 
rates were normalized (i.e. became positive); the health and education sectors 
were transformed institutionally; and so was the fiscal system, including local 
budgets, where transparent, formula-based transfers for local government were 
introduced. Major privatizations began – Romtelecom, Dacia, BRD, cement, steel 
plants – and the banking sector was cleaned out. For the first time, Romania 
appeared to have a government with a genuine pro-reform agenda. The clear 
position adopted during the Kosovo crisis, in contrast with the traditional pro-
Milosevic leaning of Iliescu, is credited today for earning the country's acceptance 
into NATO. Finally, in the last year of this interval, the care-take government of 
Isărescu adopted a supply-side economic package which triggered the 
subsequent growth, and started the negotiations with the EU.  
On the downside, the coalition accomplished less than it could have. One cause 
for this partial failure was the disastrous human resource policy of the parties in 
power, and another the sheer number of partners in the ruling coalition (four main 
parties and a host of other small but vocal groups). Moreover, the external 
conditions turned against Romania: the East-Asian crisis, followed by the Russian 
crisis, gave potential strategic investors cold feet precisely when Romania's 
governments finally decided that foreign direct investment is a good thing after all, 
and privatization acceptable. Reforms of the public administration and judiciary 
began too late and too indecisively to produce any palpable results, and strong 
lobby groups managed to delay the finalization of property restitution until the end 
of the decade.  
Key actors responsible: Emil Constantinescu (president), the party leadership of 
the Christian-Democrats, Liberals and Democrats; Mugur Isărescu (head of the 
central bank, then prime-minister) 
• 2001-2004: With no serious domestic or international crisis on their hands, the 
center-left Năstase government staged a reasonable performance as care-takers 
of the reforms initiated in the previous period. President Iliescu kept to his rather 
limited constitutional attributions and intervened less than before in domestic 
policy – at least in the first three years of his mandate – allowing premier Năstase 
to grow in office as the likely successor to PSD leadership. The restructuring of 
the mining and heavy industry has continued, though at a slower pace, and so 
has privatization: in some cases processes already started were finalized (Galaţi 
steel plant); in other cases it is entirely the merit of this government (the first 
assets sold from the energy sector). Overall, the performance was better than 
some of the critics of this government had expected, especially in economy, as 
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they built reasonably well on the foundations laid with so much effort before. 
Today the economic growth is largely real and healthy, unlike in 1995-1996.  
However, the image of the current PSD leaders as competent managers is an 
exaggeration, unless bureaucratic obedience is equated with competence. By and 
large their actions were predetermined by existing agreements with the EU, IMF 
and the World Bank. This externally-imposed agenda, though not always optimal, 
was much better than the catastrophic policies pursued independently in 1992-96. 
The current cabinet scores high marks only compared with the previous, inept 
PSD (PDSR) government of that era. It was during the current mandate that 
Bulgaria overtook Romania as the Southeast European performer. Bucharest is 
last to conclude accession discussions with EU, mostly due to the slow pace of 
negotiations in 2001-02, under Integration minister Hildegard Puwak, who 
reshuffled politically the staff of the Ministry before having to step down due to a 
scandal related to a European grant received by her family. Also on the downside, 
the Năstase government has not advanced any further with reforms in sectors 
where the current course is obviously a dead end: pensions, health care. In fact, 
it has left them exactly where they were in 2000 because it felt they are too hot to 
handle. In other areas, such as public administration and judiciary, things are 
arguably worse today than four years ago, as informal political control over these 
sensitive sectors has increased, not decreased. Ironically, while Romania has 
made progress technically by closing the acquis chapters, it has made steps back 
on pre-accession political criteria like the independence of judiciary, freedom of 
speech and corruption in administration.  
Key actors responsible: Adrian Năstase (prime minister); and, especially in 2004, 
Ion Iliescu (president). 
Two scenarios 
SAR believes there are only two likely scenarios regarding the results of the 
November 2004 elections in Romania. 
A. The opposition DA Alliance wins, the Bucharest mayor Băsescu becomes 
president, and the government is formed by the two members of the Alliance, the 
Liberals and the Democrats, with the parliamentary support (and, possibly, 
executive participation) of the Hungarian Alliance (UDMR). In this case we will 
probably assist to the speeding up of reforms in the first year / year-and-a-half. 
Public administration, judiciary and the law enforcing agencies will gain more 
independence – not necessarily because the new rulers are on average more 
moral, but because the current informal relations between the political class and 
main rent-seeking groups on the one hand, and the administration and judiciary 
on the other, will be uprooted by the very alternation in power. Traian Băsescu 
will become engaged in a fight against corruption which will soon show the 
limitations of the instruments designed in the past two years. The challenges for 
the DA Alliance government may come from the existence of a strong red-brown 
joint opposition made by PSD-PRM, the uneasy cohabitation between its 
components, the Liberals and Democrats (though things should be simpler this 
time with only two partners); and from the bottom-up pressures of various interest 
groups within the two parties, waiting for their turn to plunder the public 
resources. Liberals are particularly likely to feel such pressures, because in the 
last year they have significantly outgrown in terms of public support their shaky 
organizational structure, being the sole parliamentary heirs of the center right 
constituency.  
B. PSD wins, prime-minister Năstase becomes president, moves to the Cotroceni 
Palace, and becomes largely insulated from domestic issues. Current president 
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Iliescu returns to the helm of the ruling party and takes effective control over 
domestic policy. He imposes a weak prime minister with shaky support in the 
party so that he can rule from behind the scenes. As PSD is not likely to get more 
than 40% of the votes, the support of the Hungarian Alliance will not be enough 
this time, so they will need the Greater Romania Party (PRM). The certainty that 
they would not ally with this extremist and anti-Semitic party is rapidly vanishing. 
Following an official questioning by the American ambassador in Bucharest about 
the reasons why a major trade union has reached an agreement with PRM, 
Foreign Affairs Minister Mircea Geoană, until recently regarded as the most pro-
Western politician of PSD, reacted both formally and informally to defend PRM 
and reprimand the ambassador. Last week Miron Mitrea, the Minister of 
Transportation and Infrastructure and, unlike Geoană, a leader with real power in 
PSD, said in a press interview that a party with the kind of electoral support of 
PRM cannot be ignored, and that he personally "takes it into account". The same 
statement came from Octav Cosmâncă, another important figure at the top. 
Clearly, PSD is ready to push this door open. 
After all, it was Iliescu who managed the previous red-brown coalition with PRM in 
1995-1996. Since he is a politician of formidable skill, but a weak and 
opportunistic leader in terms of policies, his return in domestic policy is likely to 
bear his indelible mark: populism, double language at home and abroad, 
triangulations between the main economic interest groups, manipulation of state 
institutions and nominally independent agencies through close allies appointed as 
their heads. The group of people Iliescu has supported all along and placed on 
the parliamentary lists this year look strikingly different from the young, 
professional public managers advertised by Năstase's wing of the party as "the 
new PSD"8. They are rather mid-aged, gray bureaucrats with uncertain skills and 
a history of collaboration with various intelligence services, tied with the president 
by personal loyalty. The most illustrative example is general Ioan Talpeş, army 
ideologue under Ceauşescu, then head of intelligence services after 1989 with 
good connections inside the Milosevic regime, blamed by the media for 
overseeing the underground oil trade with Yugoslavia during the embargo, and 
involved in the affair of the corrupt NATO official Willem Matser. Earlier this year 
president Iliescu imposed Talpeş, above the head of the premier, as deputy 
prime-minister in charge with Justice and EU Integration. Last week Talpeş made 
again headlines when he invited the Austrian far-right leader Jorg Haider for an 
official visit to Caraş Severin, the constituency from where he runs for 
Parliament9.  
In fact Iliescu has never used his undeniable authority to pursue any consistent 
policies, or really fight corruption in practice, so a new period of indecisiveness 
can be expected, similar to that of 1992-96, with the only difference that this time 
we will be stuck not at the start line, but somewhere along the way towards 
Europe. The sources of growth will gradually wear off, and the country will enter 
another era of lost opportunities. It will eventually join the EU – and remain a 
black hole with pervasive corruption and Byzantine politics, hard to understand by 
its partners, where nothing is what appears to be and things are decided not by 
open discussion, but by informal negotiations and bargains, while rules continue 
to be enforced selectively.   
 
                                                 
8 In short supply even now in the executive, anyway.  
9 Needless to say, Talpeş has an impressive and hard to explain personal wealth, which is why he too 
appears on the list of the Coalition for a Clean Parliament.  
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CHALLENGES AND TEST CASES FOR THE 2005-2008 MANDATE 
• Purging the Parliament of representatives who have dubious personal histories, 
switched parties while in office or were in conflict of interests at various moments 
of their political career. While no political actor is perfect in this respect, the 
current ruling party proved to be the least willing (or able) to clean its ranks, in 
spite of the attempts made in the last few months. The failed experiment of 
"primaries" held this summer by PSD, when the lists resulted where endlessly 
adjusted to accommodate candidates rejected by ordinary members, showed that 
even when the formal leadership tries to restructure the party, the informal 
networks are stronger and get it their way, at least as long as PSD holds power.  
• Reforming and depoliticizing the judiciary. This monumental task has better 
chances under scenario A because, as shown before, the rotation in power may 
create a window of opportunity for a final wave of reforms able to make Romania 
politically compatible with the EU.  
• Preserving the necessary independence of the central bank (BNR) from the 
executive, after the new governing board took office in October this year. The 
delicate macro balances during the turbulent times ahead may be difficult to 
maintain, especially if scenario B becomes reality, with people like Florin 
Georgescu, the sloppy and heterodox minister of finance of the stagnation era as 
deputy-head of the central bank.  
• Fixing the pension system: reducing the high pressure on contributors and in the 
same time maintaining the real value of pensions. The "recalculations" proposed 
by both main contenders in these elections are a necessary, but far from 
sufficient step. They represent a marginal adjustment, not a structural reform of a 
system which is rapidly approaching the point of collapse. The situation is actually 
so bad that there is no quick fix at hand, and as a result we do not see here any 
scenario which is better than the other.  
• Selling the remaining state-owned banking sector (BCR and CEC) and continuing 
the privatization of the energy sector. For all the recent hype about Eastern 
Europe as a re-discovered land of opportunity, our region – and Romania in 
particular – are still not attractive enough by themselves to lure in large foreign 
investors. Transparency and predictable behavior are crucial for the speedy and 
successful privatization of important national assets. The protracted experience 
with Petrom and BCR, where important bidders were put off by indecision and 
erratic signals coming from Bucharest, is not good omens for the future. Scenario 
A seems to be better than B, if only because two or three years ago key decision 
makers from PSD still had doubts whether the state should completely sell its 
banking assets.  
• Concluding important public procurement contracts in a transparent manner, by 
guarding the national interest. For example, will the foreseeable buying of fighter 
jets for the army in 2005 or 2006 be the next big public procurement scandal (like 
in some other new EU member countries), after the string of such cases this 
year? National security is no excuse for spending taxpayers' money in an opaque 
manner, nor should such contracts be used in attempts to buy off the benevolence 
of Western partners or get waivers to unfulfilled international commitments. After 
comparing the recent controversial contracts (Bechtel, Vinci, EADS) with the 
famous Bell Helicopter affair of 1998, when the issue was debated openly and the 
government decided finally to resist pressures and temptations, it looks again that 
scenario A, though no guarantee, is likely to offer more transparency and 
accountability.  
 
